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UNNECESSARY PRIVACY
Carl Felsenfeld*
An individual's right to privacy in an electronic society has
gained international attention as a booming new field. Its birth
may roughly be marked to coincide with the birth of the In-
ternet. The flow of information without limit or boundary has
raised concerns with the consumer spokespeople in the Western
World that personal information about them may flow as easily
as general information about Machu Pichu, Keynesian econom-
ics, or Harvard College. The fear is that will cause individuals
harm, ranging from personal embarrassment to a loss of civil
liberties. Therefore, movements are developing to limit this
flow of information. The direction that this movement should
take is the subject of controversy. This article argues that our
right to the privacy of electronic information is of no real conse-
quence to us and has largely already been lost. Furthermore,
most of the information about us should not be squeezed to the
vest like a winning poker hand, but, rather, should be happily
publicized. What had been thought of as dirty little secrets,
should better be seen as fresh air.
I. THE PROBLEM
The United States and Europe view the treatment of per-
sonal electronic information differently. In the United States,
studies of personal information and privacy are now common
place. A White House Infrastructure Task Force formed in 1993
wrote one document of some significance, which was released
over the signatures of President Clinton and Vice President
Gore. Titled A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce,'
the document is peculiarly unsatisfying. Prominent in it is the
statement "Americans treasure privacy." Yet, when specifics
are called for to enjoy the treasure, the Framework presents as a"principle" the industry-pleasing:
[G]overnments should encourage industry self-regulation wherever
appropriate and support the efforts of private sector organizations to
* Professor of Law, Fordham Law School.
1. See generally 1993 White House Infrastructure Task Force, A Framework for
Global Electronic Commerce (Nov. 1995), at http//www.iitf.nist.gov/eleccomm/
ecomm.htm.
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develop mechanisms to facilitate the successful operation of the In-
ternet. Even where collective agreements or standards are necessary,
private entities should, where possible, take the lead in organizing
them.2
There are many people, particularly those representing con-
sumer interests and on federal and state legislatures, who be-
lieve that in areas like privacy protection, industry self-
regulation is really no regulation at all. Sides have been drawn
and there are those who are convinced that consumers will re-
ceive privacy protection only if there is law, including regula-
tion, that prescribes levels of protection well beyond those that
exist today. On the other side, there is a body of opinion that
believes only the give and take of the free enterprise system can
achieve the appropriate level of regulation. The consumer rep-
resentatives tend to believe that self-regulation is no regulation
at all, essentially allowing the foxes to rule the hen house.
In the United States, a disorganized scatter of laws and reg-
ulations governing and controlling consumer privacy exists. 3
Some exist at the federal level,4 but many more at the state
level. Among state laws are those that require consumer con-
sent in advance before personal information about them may be
transferred, while others provide much lighter levels of protec-
tion. Some states have no privacy laws at all. A pervasive layer
of common law doctrine, however, exists according consumers
rights as against institutions to which they give personal infor-
mation. This doctrine is based upon such factors as actual or
presumed agreements between consumer and institution, and
reasonable consumer expectations deriving from the nature of
their relationship with business institutions.
One of the major efforts to voice the need for heavier pri-
vacy regulation was the Federal Trade Commission's (F.T.C.)
May 2000 report to Congress titled Privacy Online: Fair Infor-
mation Practices in the Electronic Marketplace.5 The report was
2. Id.
3. 2 L. RICHARD FISCHER, THE LAW OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY 5.04[3] (3d ed.
2000) (describing laws and regulations governing and controlling consumer privacy).
4. See Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2001). One of the
most prominent of such federal statutes is the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970. Id.
5. See DIVISION OF FINANCIAL PRACTICES, BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTEC-
TION, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRAC-
TICES IN THE ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE: A FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION REPORT
TO CONGRESS (May 2000) [hereinafter PRIVACY ONLINE], at http://www.ftc.gov/os/
2000/05/index.htm#22. The Division of Financial Practices Bureau of Consumer Pro-
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the F.T.C.'s third on the subject and essentially consistent with
an earlier 1998 report that was highly critical of industry prac-
tices concluding that the industry had "fallen far short of what is
needed to protect consumers." The 2000 report was based upon
industry recognition of what the F.T.C. considered the four prin-
ciples of adequate privacy protection: notice (to the consumer of
industry privacy procedures), choice (of the consumer to the use
of information about him), access (by the consumer to informa-
tion retained about him), and security (maintained by industry
in consumer information).
The report acknowledges that, because of the wide variety
in the nature of industry practices and the difficulties of match-
ing and tabulating responses, "[t]here are limits ... to the value
of this data."6 Nevertheless, the F.T.C. concluded that "only a
small percentage of sites are providing protection in core ar-
eas."7 Among business representatives, the F.T.C. is usually
considered to be slanted in favor of consumer interests. For ex-
ample, the Democratic influence dominated the F.T.C. during
its privacy releases. We are unaware of any change of heart on
privacy matters the F.T.C. may have experienced in view of
more recent political changes.
Not to be accused of a pro-consumer bias in financially-re-
lated matters is the American Bankers Association. Generally
allied with the policies of the aforementioned Clinton/Gore
framework, the American Bankers Association believes that the
current structure of privacy protection laws now existing in the
United States is essentially sufficient and that industry self-regu-
lation should govern change, to the extent change is called for.
In 1997, the American Bankers Association published a set of
eight Privacy Principles for banks to follow to establish a satis-
factory level of customer financial privacy. The guidelines are:
1. Recognition of a Customer's Expectation of Privacy.
This includes the possibility of explaining the principles of finan-
cial privacy to customers prior to a banking relationship.
2. Use, Collection and Retention of Customer Information
Only if the Institution Believes the Customer Will Benefit.
tection drafted this document. Id. Other F.T.C. privacy-related reports are also avail-
able at http://www.ftc.gov. Id.
6. PRIVACY ONLINE, supra note 5, at 11. One-fifth of the sites currently provide
protection in core areas. Id.
7. Id. at 12.
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Among potential benefits to consumers is the institutions' abil-
ity to offer consumers products, services, and other
opportunities.
3. Maintenance of Adequate Information. Financial institu-
tions should ensure that the consumer information they retain is
accurate.
4. Limiting Employee Access to Information. Only those
employees with a legitimate business reason to see consumer in-
formation should have access to it.
5. Protection of Information via Established Security Pro-
cedures. Consumer customer information should be kept safe.
6. Restrictions on the Disclosure of Account Information.
Consumer customer information should be disclosed to third
parties only for certain prescribed purposes including: (1) when
it is necessary to assist the customer in accomplishing his own
transaction; (2) when the customer requests it; (3) when the law
requires disclosure; or (4) when the customer has been
informed.
7. Maintaining Customer Privacy in Business Relationships
With Third Parties. Institutions should require the third parties
legitimately receiving the customer information to maintain sim-
ilar standards.
8. An Institution's Privacy Principles or Policies Will Be
Made Known to the Customer.
The American Bankers Association followed its statement
of Privacy Principles with a more broad-based consideration of
the American privacy law.8 They issued their statement, titled
Financial Privacy in America, in June 1998. 9 The statement indi-
cates that the U.S. banking industry is highly regulated, and that
this regulation "[h]as been successful in providing adequate con-
sumer privacy protection, while permitting the free flow of in-
formation that is vital to not only the financial services industry,
but our economy as a whole." The study goes on to emphasize
that privacy regulation in the United States is not based upon a
single source of law, but rather "[a]n extensive combination of
overlapping federal and state laws governing personal privacy."
8. See CARL FELSENFELD, INTERNATIONAL BANKING REGULATION VI-59 (Juris
ed. 2000).
9. CONSUMER BANKERS ASSOCIATION, FINANCIAL PRIVACY IN AMERICA, A RE-
VIEW OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICE ISSUES (June 1998), at http://
www.cbanet.org/Government/Privacy/privacyreview.htm.
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As for federal laws, the study lists the following: The Fair Credit
Reporting Act of 1970, The Electronic Fund Transfer Act of
1978, The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, The Fair Credit
Billing Act, The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991,
The Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention
Act of 1991, The Federal Trade Commission Act, The Right to
Financial Privacy Act of 1978, The Electronic Communications
Privacy Act of 1986, The Cable Communications Policy Act of
1984, and The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984.10
These enactments do not all centrally concern privacy. For
example, the Federal Trade Commission Act establishes a major
federal bureaucracy for the regulation of trade, both consumer
and commercial and does little more than provide an area of
jurisdiction for consumer privacy consideration. Its basic sub-
stantive direction is a command that the F.T.C. act to prevent"unfair" or "deceptive" practices in the marketplace. The
American Bankers Association study, as an Appendix, also
charts the state laws protecting privacy and notes enactments in
four separate areas: right to financial privacy acts; laws prohibit-
ing recording credit card numbers on checks; laws limiting use of
confidential customer information in insurance sales; and laws
limiting use of social security numbers.'
Interest in personal privacy has been increasing for some
years. It has escalated since the widespread availability of credit
cards and the transmission of card-related information over the
Internet. The public joinder into card-related activity has essen-
tially made real privacy unavailable, a fact that is only gradually
10. See generally Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2001);
Electronic Fund Transfer Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. § 1693 (2001); Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2001); Fair Credit Billing Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1666
(2001); Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. § 609 (2001);
Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act of 1991, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 41-58 (2001); Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. § 3401-3422 (2001);
Electronic Communication Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2521-3127 (2001); Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1884, 47 U.S.C. § 521-559 (2001); Comprehensive
Crime Control Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3141-3742 (2001).
11. See American Bankers Association, Consumer Privacy: A Free Choice (Sept.
2001), at http://www.pacificresearch.org/. Another broad-based privacy study is titled
Consumer Privacy: A Free Choice Approach released September 2001, by the Pacific
Research Institute for Public Policy, a conservative think-tank. Id. It warns that
much of the privacy legislation pending in Congress and the state legislatures will
harm rather than help consumers. Id. The study cautions that new laws may lull
consumers into feeling safe, but the only way to guarantee protection is to safeguard
themselves. Id.
2002]
370 SUFFOLK TRANSNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
being recognized. Attention to privacy issues has escalated not
only in the United States, but, perhaps to an even greater ex-
tent, in the European Community as well. In the United States,
we tend to see fundamental civil liberties law as protecting us as
individuals from governmental intrusion. For example, the First
Amendment to the Constitution prohibits the federal govern-
ment from interfering with the public's rights of free expression,
religion, and assembly. Much of our reliance upon self-regula-
tion in privacy protection, as contrasted with externally imposed
law legislators and regulators design for our protection, un-
doubtedly derives from our fundamental suspicion of govern-
ment and desire to be free of its controls.
In the European Community, public feelings about govern-
ment are not quite the same. Government on the European
continent is perceived more as the protector of individual needs,
rather than an entity who interferes with those needs. Europe is
more comfortable with a socialist approach where government
protects an individual's liberties, basic needs such as food and
shelter, and continuing rights to employment. Thus, it should
come as no surprise that the European Union (EU) enacted a
Union-wide Data Protection Directive (Directive) in 199512 pur-
porting to protect rights in privacy as against industry-created
interference.
The Directive was stated to deal with two basic aspects of
data employment: "[t]he processing of personal data and (on)
the free movement of such data." In Whereas clause number 3,
the Directive asserted that "[p]ersonal data should be able to
flow freely from one Member State to another, but also that the
fundamental rights of individuals should be safeguarded." That
these two objectives should turn out to be inconsistent appar-
ently presented no problem. The Directive heightened Ameri-
can interest in privacy law largely because a provision addressed
information transfer from an EU state to a foreign state.
Whereas clause number 57 reads in major part: "[t]he transfer of
personal data to a third country which does not ensure an ade-
quate level of protection must be prohibited."
Aware of the close relationship of European and American
financial affairs, the EU Parliament considered the protection
American privacy law provided consumers and, while not specif-
12. Council Directive 95/46/EC, 1995 0. J. (L 281) 31.
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ically asserting that American privacy laws were inadequate
under the Directive's standards, obviously did not consider "ad-
equate" the overall structure of U.S. law.13 Consequently, sub-
ject to variations in U.S. law or some form of concordat between
the EU and the United States, a risk existed that personal infor-
mation acquired and stored in the EU could not be transferred
to the United States. This could create major problems. A large
international bank with customers in the EU and processing
centers in the United States could not transmit information con-
cerning those customers across the Atlantic. A credit reporting
company could not report personal credit information gathered
in Europe to the United States.
II. EUROPEAN UNION LEVEL OF PROTECTION
Basic to privacy protection in the EU, the Directive
prescribes that personal data may not be processed without the
express consent of the person involved. The Directive expressly
provides, "[p]ersonal data may be processed only if (a) the data
subject has unambiguously given his consent." 14 This has be-
come known as the "opt-in" standard with the ability to collect
personal data subject to the will of the individual involved.
When law in the United States exists and, in general, a financial
institution has undertaken to grant rights of privacy to its cus-
tomers, an opposite standard, generally called "opt-out," is in
favor.15 Under the "opt-out" approach, an individual has the
right to demand that the collection and/or the commercial use of
personal information about him be stopped or curtailed.
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999,16 whose major con-
tribution to American law was to liberalize the powers of bank
13. Conference, Successfully Managing the New Data Protection Laws, Privacy
Laws and Business (July 2000), available at http://www.privacylaws.com/products
frame.htm.
14. Council Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 12, art. 7. There are other bases for
the collection of personal information such as where it is necessary to perform a con-
tract to which the subject is a party, or where it is required to perform a legal obliga-
tion. Id. Member States of the EU may also establish additional categories for their
own purposes. Id. These other provisions do not affect our argument.
15. Dep't of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, § 350,
106 Pub. L. No. 69, 113 Stat. 686 (1999). An exception to the prevailing approach is a
federal law requiring states, as a condition to receiving federal highway funds, to re-
quire "opt-in" consent from individuals before information about them in motor vehi-
cle records may be used commercially. Id.
16. Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (2001)).
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holding companies, has certain provisions relating to consumer
privacy. These are of the "opt-out" variety. The Act provides in
pertinent part:
A financial institution may not disclose nonpublic personal informa-
tion to a nonaffiliated third party unless ...
(B) the customer is given the opportunity, before the time that such
information is initially disclosed, to direct that such information not
be disclosed to such third party; and
(C) the customer is given an explanation of how the consumer can
exercise that nondisclosure option.17
These requirements are embodied in regulations issued by the
appropriate regulators: for banks, principally the Federal Re-
serve Board, the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation; for institutions that are not
banks, principally the F.T.C.18 Notices were distributed to insti-
tution customers before July 1, 2001, the date prescribed by
Gramm-Leach-Bliley.19
The U.S. position on privacy is thus the scattering of laws
and regulations described in the American Bankers Association
paper2o and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley "opt-out" notices. It has
been generally assumed that these laws and regulations will not
provide the level of adequate protection to consumer informa-
tion that the Directive requires. Such action that has been taken
in Europe and the United States since the Directive has been
based upon that assumption.
A surprising absence of interference by European authori-
ties with information flowing from the EU to the United States
has occurred. An early example was action in 1997 by the Ger-
man Deputy Commissioner of Data Protection preventing Cit-
icorp (now Citigroup), the New York bank holding company,
from moving information from Germany to the United States.
This actually was before the Directive's effective date, but im-
posed under prior German law containing a similar principle.21
An agreement entered into by Citicorp specifying a satisfactory
17. Id. at § 502.
18. See 12 C.F.R. § 216 (2001) (listing Federal Reserve System applicable to
member banks).
19. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, supra note 16, at 103.
20. See generally CONSUMER BANKERS ASSOCIATION, supra note 9.
21. Conference, How to Comply With the EU Data Protection Directive Using
ISO 9000 Quality Assurance Principles, Privacy Laws and Business (Oct. 1997), avail-
able at http://www.privacylaws.com/productsframe.htm.
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level of protection provided to the information received re-
solved this problem. The concept of individual agreements ac-
cording EU interests an acceptable level of privacy protection
has been discussed from time to time over the years, but has not
achieved any general level of acceptance.
The difference between the level of privacy protection re-
quired in Europe and that granted in the United States cannot
be overstated. For one thing, there is an EU-wide document,
the Directive, prescribing in general terms the appropriate level
of protection, including the "opt-in" standard. The Directive re-
quires that the Member States "determine more precisely the
conditions under which the processing of personal data is law-
ful."22 Nevertheless, the basic standards are the same across the
EU. In the United States, much of the applicable law is estab-
lished at the state level and, consequently, different depending
upon the state affected. The federal law that does exist ad-
dresses particular problems and not privacy itself.
American state law is free of the "opt-in" standard. The
concept has received some attention in California where, as of
this writing, September 2001, an "opt-in" bill passed the Assem-
bly Appropriations Committee.2 3 American bankers are op-
posed to an "opt-in" standard of data protection. One objection
is based upon the monumental record keeping and derivative
expense that would be required if every customer were re-
quested to give separate consent.
Amazing to an American lawyer, the Directive's "opt-in"
standard appears not to be observed. Privacy expert Fred H.
Cate of the University of Indiana Law School writes:
First, while it is true that European nations are required under the
European Union data protection directive, which took effect in 1998,
to condition the collection, use, or transfer of personal information on
explicit consent, there is little evidence that any have, in fact, done so.
European data protection officials have repeatedly pointed out the
impossibility of doing so. Instead, Europe has used a concept of "im-
plied explicit consent"-if individuals are told of the intended data
collection or use and do not object, then surely, European data pro-
tection officials argue, they must have opted-in.2 4
22. Council Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 12, ch. II, art. 5.
23. Nicole Duran, California Panel Clears Privacy Bill, AMERICAN BANKER,
Sept. 7, 2001, at 20.
24. FRED H. CATE, FINANCIAL SERVICES COORDINATING COUNCIL, OP'r-IN Ex-
POSED (2001), available at www.fsccnews.com/publications/.
2002)
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Professor Cate's information is consistent with a 1999 arti-
cle by Professor Amitai Etzioni of George Washington Univer-
sity that provides: 25 "[i]t seems that this EU directive is one of
those laws that is enacted to keep one group - privacy advocates
and their followers - happy and, as a rule, is not enforced so that
commerce and life can continue." This casual disregard of law is
difficult for an American law professor to accept, although other
sources mentioned in the articles of both Professor Cates and
Etzioni (and subsequent telephone conversations between the
author and both of them) support the conclusion. Based upon
these insights, however, it is not unreasonable to conclude that
the same legal requirement can be accepted with ease in the EU
and represent a destructive bureaucratic force in the United
States.
A comparative study of the EU and the United States in
this regard is necessary. A strong feeling exists that something
is missing from the reports cited above and more is to be
learned before conclusions can be reached. Is it a different feel-
ing about law on the two sides of the Atlantic, or is it ignorance
in the United States of what is occurring in the EU? Perhaps, as
another possibility, the EU reaction can be ascribed to the par-
ticular relationship of EU banks and their customers. It has
even been suggested that EU banks may prefer not to get their
customers' consent to the economic use of otherwise private in-
formation so that they are not encouraged to give or sell the
information to other institutions, banks or otherwise. In that
manner, the EU banks will be more likely to retain their existing
customer relationships and be relieved of the need to compete
with those who are less informed.
Relationships between the EU and the United States are
remarkably unstrained in view of the Directive's requirements
and the apparent shortfall in American law. The United States
has not seen any organized restriction upon the transfer of EU
personal information across the Atlantic, despite what appears
to be the opportunity to impose restraints. This result is highly
reminiscent of the situation that exists in the banking field under
the EU Second Banking Directive, 26 which provides that a for-
eign bank may not branch into the EU unless EU banks may
25. Amitai Etzioni, Protecting Privacy: Personal View, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1999.
26. Council Directive 89/646/EEC, 1989 O.J. (L 386) 1.
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branch into the foreign country. The United States, however,
has significant restraints upon entry by foreign banks, particu-
larly at the state level. Robert L. Clarke, a prior Comptroller of
the Currency, stated in a report to Congress:
The more significant disparities between U.S. treatment of domestic
and foreign banks occur at the state rather than the federal level.
Several states - Florida, New Jersey, and Virginia, for example - and
the District of Columbia restrict entry by foreign bank holding com-
panies. In other instances, regional banking compacts exclude partici-
pation by foreign banks.2 7
Based on various informal conversations with EU banking
officials, they are well aware of the absence of reciprocity in the
United States and their ability to exclude American banks from
the EU. On the other hand, this is not their objective. They
would much rather have a flourishing interchange of banks
across the Atlantic. Thus, given the general policy of "national
treatment" in the United States, the EU prefers to look at those
state restrictions as relatively minor deviations that can be (at
least for the time being) ignored. The same may apply to the
Data Protection Directive and its requirement for adequate pro-
tection. It is more seemly that information travel between our
two continents and that we deal with the problem to find resolu-
tions short of blockade.
The most focused work undertaken in the United States to
bridge the gap with the Directive has been the Department of
Commerce's Safe Harbor Principles (Principles).28 Released on
July 24, 2000, the Principles, together with some relevant sup-
porting materials including a presentation of how an organiza-
tion's commitment to them will be enforced in the United
States, were forwarded by Commerce Department Office of In-
ternational Trade Administration/Trade Development to the
European Commission in Brussels with a request that the Com-
mission determine the Principles' adequacy under the Directive.
The forwarding letter stated: "[o]ur expectation is that the Euro-
pean Commission will determine that this safe harbor frame-
work provides adequate protection for the purposes of Article
25.1 of the Data Protective Directive and data transfers from the
27. Id. See also THE CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, A PROFILE OF
STATE CHARTERED BANKING, Part V (18th ed. 2000).
28. 65 F.R. 45666-01 (2000).
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European Union would continue to organizations that partici-
pate in the safe harbor."
The Principles' underlying approach is to commit a domes-
tic organization in the United States to honor them. The Princi-
ples would thereby achieve compliance with the Directive and
the U.S. organization could receive personal information from
the EU. Thus, the term "safe harbor." Compliance with the
Principles is entirely voluntary. Typically an organization will
rely upon self-regulation to comply with the Principles. When
an organization undertakes to rely upon the Principles and fails
to do so, however, it may be subject to action under Section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act prohibiting unfair and de-
ceptive acts.
Organizations wishing to take advantage of the Principles
must commit adherence to seven separate principles summa-
rized in the underlying document. It requires that they apply
those principles to personal data acquired after they enter the
safe harbor system. The specific principles and a few words
about each follow:
1. Notice. An organization must inform individuals about
the purposes for which it collects and uses information. It must
inform about how to contact the organization with any inquiries
or complaints and the types of third parties to which it discloses
the information.
2. Choice. Individuals must have the right to "opt out"
from use and third party disclosure of the individuals' informa-
tion. For sensitive information (i.e. personal information speci-
fying medical or health conditions, racial or ethnic origin,
political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade union
membership, or information specifying the individual's sex life),
the Principles deviate from their general "opt-out" position and
require that the individual be given an explicit - "opt-in" -
choice.
3. Onward Transfer. Organizations must ensure that third
parties to whom it transfers personal information have relatively
the same level of responsibility - that, for example, they sub-
scribe to the Principles themselves or agree to do so - in essen-
tially the same manner as the initial organization. If an
organization conforms to this principle, it shall not be held re-
sponsible if a third party to which it transfers information uses it
in a way contrary to any restriction.
[Vol. 25:2
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4. Security. Organizations must take reasonable steps to
protect individuals from loss, misuse and unauthorized access,
disclosure, alteration, and destruction of personal information.
5. Data Integrity. Personal information must be relevant
to the purposes for which it is to be used. Organizations should
take reasonable steps to ensure that data is accurate, complete,
current, and therefore reliable for its intended use.
6. Access. Individuals must have access to the information
about them and be able to correct, amend, or delete information
when it is inaccurate. An exception exists where the burden or
expense of providing access would be disproportionate to the
risks to the individual's privacy in the case in question, or when
providing access would violate the rights of persons other than
the individual.
7. Enforcement. There must be a mechanism to assure
compliance with the Principles that would provide recourse for
individuals to whom the data relates affected by non-compli-
ance. There must be consequences for an organization when it
does not follow the Principles, including damages.
There is something pap-like about these Principles: a TV
show written by a computer, a political program based upon
public opinion polls. To a large extent they confirm what has
been generally found acceptable. They tend to satisfy industry.
They neither ruffle nor delight the consumer. They do not, of
course, satisfy those committed to higher levels of privacy
protection.
Commitment to the Principles may satisfy the United States
Department of Commerce; this does not guarantee that they
will satisfy the EU and the Directive's requirements. Called"safe harbor," the Principles do not contain the assurance that
those words imply. Will one who adopts them be sure that they
will satisfy the Directive and the EU may freely transfer infor-
mation to the United States? As the Principles were working
their way through the drafting process, there was considerable
sentiment in both the United States and Europe that they did
not go far enough to give the kind of consumer protection the
Directive calls for.
2002]
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To obtain a definitive ruling, the Principles' efficacy was put
to the Commission of the European Communities. 29 The Com-
mission decided that the Principles satisfied the Directive. The
essence of the decision held that: "[t]he adequate level of pro-
tection for the transfer of data from the Community to the
United States recognised by this Decision, should be attained if
organisations comply with the Principles for the protection of
personal data transferred from a Member State to the United
States ... "30
An additional problem, however, relating to the interrela-
tionship of the Directive and the Commission Decision remains.
The Decision provides that there shall be assurance that volun-
tary acquiescence in the Principles shall have teeth. Organiza-
tions shall "be subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade
Commission . . .or that of another body." It further provides
that for an organization in the United States to obtain the bene-
fit of the Principles, the organization must be:
subject to the statutory powers of a government body in the United
States listed in Annex VII to this Decision which is empowered to
investigate complaints and to obtain relief against unfair or deceptive
practices as well as redress for individuals, irrespective of their coun-
try of residence or nationality, in case of non-compliance with the
Principles.
Two regulatory agencies are listed in Annex VII, the F.T.C.
and the U.S. Department of Transportation. The latter Depart-
ment is of fairly limited jurisdiction. By way of contrast, the
F.T.C. has broad regulatory powers over most of the businesses
in the United States. Unfortunately, banks are exempt from
that regulatory reach and generally subject to the control of
their specific financial regulators, both at the state and at the
federal level.31 This leads to the conclusion that banks, some of
29. See John R. Schmertz & Mike Meier, Japan Issues Law Approving Electronic
Signatures and Certification Services, Reflecting Efforts Underway in U.S. and EU to
Provide Legal Effect to Such Transmissions, INT'L L. UPDATE, July 2000, available at
LEXIS, Legal News, International Law Newsletters. We do not attempt here a read-
ing of the jurisdiction of the Commission to decide this question. Suffice to say that it
is apparently subject to some question.
30. Commission Decision pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European
Parliament.
31. We include here such organizations as the Federal Reserve Board, the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and,
of course, the many state regulators that have primary jurisdiction over the state bank
system.
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the major disseminators and users of consumer personal finance
information, cannot benefit from the Principles. It would conse-
quently appear that American banks, barring some variation in
law not now contemplated, are prohibited from receiving per-
sonal information from the European Community. As Ameri-
can banks now have major branches, affiliates, and subsidiaries
in the EU, this can be a major business problem. (Where banks
will land in this morass is open to question. A Department of
Commerce spokesperson warned the banks that if they did not
sign on to some form of protections, they would miss out on
business opportunities in Europe).32
As of the beginning of October 2001, 103 companies in the
United States had signed on to the Principles. This was up from
30 in May. Despite the more than 300 percent rise, only a mi-
nuscule portion of the millions of U.S. businesses seemed to ex-
perience sufficient desire for information from the EU and
sufficient confidence in the Principles to join the system. Most
of the signatories were little-known companies; some (Hewlett-
Packard, Yamaha, B.M.W.) were not. It is presently unclear as
to why the response was so stingy. Perhaps few companies be-
lieve that they have need of EU information; perhaps they be-
lieve that the Directive's terms will not impede delivery;
perhaps they believe that the Principles will really have no
effect.
III. PRIVACY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Consumer spokespeople are asserting that the disclosure of
personal information has gone too far and that greater restraints
upon the various dissemination systems are now appropriate.
However much an individual may deplore the loss of personal
privacy, the question is rarely asked: are we in a situation where
it is still possible to restrain the outward flow of information, or
has the technical capacity of contemporary computer equipment
already outstripped that ability. There are some indications that
32. W.A. Lee, U.S. Banks Urged to Meet E. U. Data Rules, AMERICAN BANKER,
Oct. 24, 2000, at 1. Ms. Wellbery, the then head of the electronic commerce task force
for the International Trade Administration in the Department of Commerce and a
primary draftsperson for the Principles, is now a lawyer in private practice in Wash-
ington, D .C. Id. See also Guy Jonquieres De, EU 'No' to Data Privacy Delay, FIN.
TIMES, May 7, 2001, at 9. Meanwhile, the EU Commission seems to be undecided as
to the approach it should take to the dilemma and is considering options. Id.
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we may not yet have gone too far. A French court recently or-
dered Yahoo!, the U.S. based server, to take all possible mea-
sures to prevent France's access to web pages stored on
Yahoo!'s server that auction Nazi objects, or present any Nazi
sympathy or holocaust denial.33 The French court's ability to
validly prevent a foreign sender electronic access to its territory
has been interpreted as an indication that the world is under
control. The Yahoo! case, however, represents but one instance
of an immeasurable number of disclosure opportunities.
New generations of computer equipment are constantly
outstripping their bounds. "If personal information exists on
the Internet, it can be found by anyone who is interested enough
to go looking for it ... Each week, information becomes easier
to obtain. This trend will continue for the foreseeable future." 34
Equipment manufacturers still protest that their machines are
subject to control; but their protestations have a hollow ring. In
an article on computer sophistication and privacy, the New York
Times concluded, "[t]hat quandary - that it is almost impossible
to compartmentalize information for one purpose so that it can-
not be misused - lies at the heart of the (privacy) argument." 35
The manufacturers apparently do not realize that they have al-
ready lost the argument when they defend their products as pri-
vacy-friendly. The same article makes a more cogent comment
when it quotes the CEO of Sun Microsystems: "You already
have zero privacy - get over it."
In both the EU and the United States, it appears that the
law of privacy is still essentially undefined. The system is out of
control, and privacy is simply not protected regardless of
Europeans' belief that their privacy is protected and Americans'
express desire for privacy. Despite the arguments for and
against privacy in the consumer and business communities and
before the legislatures, it really is not an issue at all. I suggest
that there is so much information out there about us that we can
now afford to ignore it. (At least most of it. The end of this
article briefly addresses areas where rights of privacy may still
have some cogency.) It is like the naked man on the nude
33. League Against Racism and Antisemitism v. Yahoo! Inc., TGI Paris, Oron-
nance de refere du 20 Nov. 2000.
34. CAROLE A. LANE, NAKED IN CYBERSPACE XXV (1997).
35. John Markoff, A Growing Compatibility Issue: Computers and User Privacy,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1999, at Al.
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beach. His condition does not concern him as it would if he
dropped his clothes in the lobby of the Waldorf.
The point is only gradually being made that those arguing
for stronger privacy rights generally have little concept of what
they have already lost, nor do they have a well-structured idea
of how little that has meant to them. The dissemination of per-
sonal information does not require that information be formally
sent for it to be received and electronically transcribed. Most of
what is put on computers, particularly those connected to large
business networks, is received and stored without the putative
sender's knowledge. Equipment that records, compiles, recon-
figures, and even retransmits information has overwhelmed our
ability to retain our privacy. Automobiles are increasingly send-
ing information about where they are and how they are per-
forming that is being stored and collated.36 This amorphous
system has not been formally designed, nor has it been analyzed
or diagrammed. "In this environment, it may be very difficult
for individuals or organizations to be sure what information is
being collected, to what uses that information is being put after
it has been collected, or with whom the information is being
shared." 37
New York Times columnist Thomas L. Friedman wrote
under an Accra, Ghana dateline:
If you're wondering why I came to Ghana, I can now reveal the truth:
I came to check my health insurance. No, really. You see, I'm en-
rolled with Aetna health insurance. And Aetna, as well as Keystone,
Mercy health care, has moved a large chunk of its data processing to a
modern high-rise in downtown Accra. There 400 young Ghanaian te-
chies -working in three eight-hour shifts and connected to the U.S. by
satellite - punch the raw claims data sent to them by the U.S. health
care giants onto computerized forms and then zip it back by satellite
to the U.S. for final processing. 38
We have come close to creating a system beyond our con-
trol. Everything about us is out there, from our taste in automo-
biles to our sock size, in central data bases or aggregated by
specialized service companies, often at the customer's specific
request, but not necessarily so. As with Thomas Friedman's in-
36. William Diem, Not Now. I'm Fighting With My Car, N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 26,
2001, at F1.
37. Winn & Wraathall, Who Owns the Consumer? The Emerging Law of Com-
mercial Transactions in Electronic Customer Data, 56 Bus. LAw 213 (2000).
38. Thomas L. Friedman, It Takes a Satellite, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2001, at A27.
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surance information, personal information is increasingly con-
trolled by foreign technicians in foreign databases. It is all
stored in contemporary computers and can be refined, subdi-
vided, expanded, combined, and transported as needed. Limou-
sines or SUVs, size 10, or medium?
The consumer is normally unaware of the tracks he or she is
creating. A casual transaction will normally create multiple
items of information. When we buy a train ticket or use an elec-
tronic toll pass, our travel routes are recorded as is the purchase
form used. Payments lead to our bank accounts, while the use
of credit notes our obligations and affects our creditworthiness.
When we surf the Internet, our various interests are automati-
cally recorded in different places; it is not necessary even to use
a credit card or subscribe to a chat room to leave an individual's
spoor, although those connections create their own records.
Even when we register objection to the collection of informa-
tion, we are recorded as being in an identifiable group: those
who are sensitive to the use of information. It is becoming too
much to control.
A worldwide cease-and-desist order on the spread of infor-
mation is probably not too late to impose. For such an order to
be effective, however, it would take the cooperation of all coun-
tries, large and small, and require agreement as to what should
be done. This is not impossible, but highly unlikely. Given the
dissension already existing within privacy circles in the United
States, we are not likely to reach international agreement on a
desirable privacy policy. Whatever is done will be the result of
broad compromise among groups in disagreement. To expect
that such a compromise position can be achieved throughout the
world requires at the very least a United Nations squared.
Of what value are the privacy protections already in place.
This article later addresses the specialized fields that probably
do require the concealment of individual information. Those
are, however, few. What of the mass of consumer communica-
tion being logged every minute of every day. Is this really of
significance to the consumers affected? If it is really useful to
some, such as the people selling size 10 socks or SUVs, how
much do the rest of us really care? What is the degree of impor-
tance to be given to the fact that I repaired my car at Steve &
Francine's on West 60th Street and bought a bus ticket to Bing-
hampton? That information is already stored on various com-
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puters in various ways and in various countries. What effort and
at what cost do we want to give to suppressing it?
Feelings matter. Most people probably do have some sense
that much about them is inviolate and should not be viewed by
others. "Americans treasure privacy" wrote Clinton and Gore
in 1995. If asked to write a similar document today, they would
probably say the same thing. To say to the multitudes that their
privacy is a myth and should simply be eliminated is a tall order.
Put that way, it would probably be rejected.
Our free enterprise system, backed up by a common law
legal system, often leaves an individual without an anchor.
Neither system results in conclusive answers. Cases in the
United States Supreme Court frequently have dissents, which
means that at the very highest level there is disagreement on
what the law is. Yet we more than survive; we frequently thrive.
Congress professes to believe in free enterprise. Yet, given a
problem, how few of our elected representatives will say "leave
it alone, the system will take care of it." Whatever belief there
may be in free enterprise rarely manifests itself among legisla-
tors. That is what is happening to the privacy debate. If there is
a problem, let's write a law.
One cannot advise a consumer public to forget its rights of
privacy, whatever they may be. One can more successfully point
out that those rights have been honored within the flexible
bounds of the free enterprise system to the public's general sat-
isfaction. We have been engaged in electronic trade for some
years now with a fairly good grip on our privacy rights. It is not
our function here to give the details of those protections. The
nature of our system, however, provides that our banks, for ex-
ample, have little in the way of specific restraints upon their use
of consumer information. Nevertheless, the banking system rec-
ognizes our expectation of privacy and honors it. Banks are ac-
tually restrained by reported cases that for years have been
balancing business' rights in information collected against the
consumer's need for privacy and developed a living doctrine
that has largely satisfied both. One doctrine not widely under-
stood, but of continuing value to both bank and customer, is the
common law doctrine of implied contract. It holds that when a
customer does business with a bank, they enter into a contract,
albeit implied in nature, that places certain limits upon the
bank's use of the customer's information. The limits are cloudy
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and difficult to define. They do not satisfy those with need for
precision in legal matters, but they work.39
Subject to increased pressure to provide privacy protection
- a protection already given - banks have begun to impose re-
quirements upon their equipment vendors that exceed the war-
ranties that the vendors can give. A recent article reports:
banks are beginning to go beyond the scope of the law to impose
terms they (the vendors) find hard to meet .... In the new environ-
ment, financial services companies are asking to examine the security
of all systems maintained by Unisys (an equipment vendor). The
Blue Bell, Pa., company operates 4,000 server computers and 30,000
desktop PCs worldwide and each of them would be subject to individ-
ual scrutiny by each customer 'whether or not it has anything to do
with the problem at hand,' Mr. Cawthorne (a Unisys VP) said.40
The scope of the problem-if there is a problem-is too
large for comprehensive management. Nevertheless, the nature
of an individual's personal information legitimately deemed pri-
vate is generally kept private by the operation of the system.
Banking is one example that is consistent with current economic
theory. Our best protection as consumers is still considered to
be the free market. Karl Marx sat for years in the British Mu-
seum and conceived a theory of a controlled economy that
parsed logically; its problem was that it did not work. Almost all
the old controlled states have broken under the relentless pres-
sure of free enterprise. The consumer is protected from oligop-
oly pricing and restraints on output, not by wise men deciding
upon the appropriate prices, but by open competition.
More information is conducive to more competition. Those
who believe in the system of open, essentially unfettered compe-
tition should be opposed to greater financial privacy laws. The
direction a new level of governmental restraint will lead can
never be known for certain. Predictions that a particular altera-
tion mandated by law in the current economic pattern will have
certain results are usually wrong. The recent attempts to correct
an economic slowdown through interest rate cuts are an exam-
ple of this. The social structure today faces a grave risk from the
growing reliance upon economics as a predictive device. We are
experiencing this today in proposed changes to our bankruptcy
39. See FISCHER, supra note 3, at 5.04[3]; CONSUMER BANKERS ASSOCIATION,
supra note 9.
40. Steve Bills, Managing Privacy: Banks Setting Bar Too High, Vendors Say,
AMERICAN BANKER, Oct. 19, 2001, at 1.
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laws. Changes are proposed by academics working in seclusion
like Karl Marx in the British Museum, and telling us the effects
of their proposals with unjustified self-confidence. 41 Any pre-
diction as to the effect of newly conceived privacy laws contains
the same assumptions and the same risk of error.
The EU does not have the American confidence in the free
market system. This difference in attitude may explain the con-
tradictions noted above between EU law and EU practice. In
the above-cited article,42 Professor Cate asserts that the rela-
tively uncompetitive European financial system feeds off the re-
strictive privacy laws: "[e]fforts to open the financial services
industry - to foster the development of competition, better serve
customers, lower prices and compete more effectively with U.S.
institutions - have largely failed because of restrictive privacy
laws."
Consumer groups and certain academics in the United
States are lobbying Congress, the state legislatures, and bank
regulators to impose further restraints upon the free flow of in-
formation. Basically, they do not believe the concept of the free
market system and feel more confidence in a body of unyielding
statutes and regulations, than in the relatively messy world of
free enterprise. As a baseball manager will allow his pitcher to
pitch out of trouble, our economy and our common law system
effectively deal with troublesome issues by leaving them alone.
Legislators cannot abide by free enterprise, but it works.
In the tradition of governmental control, we freeze devel-
opment and evolution on the one hand; and do not accomplish
anything on the other hand. For example, see how long it took
the banking system to rid itself of Glass-Steagall constraints to
the time when Congress was willing to acknowledge that it re-
ally had nothing to worry about. 43 Bureaucratic solutions based
upon notices, consents, and lists of regulatory rules look to the
law of the past. They are reminiscent of exercises conducted
under the Truth in Lending Act, Fair Credit Reporting Act,
Delayed Funds Availability Act, and more. Tired notices to the
41. Block-Lieb, The Logic and Limits of Contract Bankruptcy, 2001 ILL. L REV.
503 (2001), (setting forth theoretical arguments one by one and noting what is
missed).
42. See generally CATE, supra note 24.
43. The 1934 Glass-Steagall constraints lasted from 1934 to 1999 when the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act was enacted.
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consumer in 10-point type led inexorably to the privacy notices
under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.44 The notices that were
sent out, filled with legal jargon, neither informed nor pleased
anyone. New conferences are under way to decide how to com-
ply with the notice requirement. What had been a debate about
privacy has turned into a different but more familiar debate
about how new legal requirements can be met.
A largely unrestrained system of open information with the
stimuli it gives to competition and business development is far
preferable to the constipated world of privacy to which so many
now aspire. Rather than a life largely blocked off from public
view where invasions of privacy are narrow beams of light unex-
pectedly shone into a world of concealment, lives are becoming
generally exposed. As it becomes increasingly difficult to con-
ceal where we went, what we read, what we bought, what we
played, and what we surfed for on the Internet, those subjects
become less areas of secrecy than a vast illuminating sunlight.
We need no longer fear that dictatorial power will use our short-
comings to bring us under its rule.4 5 Everyone is out there, and
the new reaction to what used to be considered an invasion of
privacy should be "so what." Ironically, too much is becoming
less.
What have been thought of as invasions of privacy are be-
coming more numerous. Our reaction should, however, not be
to build more complex walls of protection. We are protected by
the very invasions themselves. They should no longer even be
called invasions of privacy. Fresh air is a better term.
IV. CONCLUSORY OBSERVATIONS
This article suggests that the current disposition favoring in-
creased privacy protection rights needs rethinking. That is
about as far as this article wants to go. Success will be measured
by those who had previously taken privacy as an obvious good
44. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, supra note 16, at § 502. "[A] financial in-
stitution may not ... disclose to a nonaffiliated third party and nonpublic personal
information unless such financial institution provides or has provided to the consumer
a notice ...." Id.
45. See generally Admonition From the Health Information Privacy Rules Issued
by the Department of Health and Human Services, 65 Fed. Reg. 82460 (Dec. 28,
2000). "[I]t is important not to lose sight of the inherent meaning of privacy: it speaks
to our individual and collective freedom. Id.
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who will wonder whether they should not reconsider what they
have been taking for granted. This article is not recommending
legislative change. More accurately, it is suggesting that we re-
frain from change, at least until our priorities are properly
ordered.
This is not to say, however, that privacy protections are uni-
formly useless. A substantial number of privacy protections are
written into existing law and many of them are of great value
and should, at the very least, be retained. In general, they result
from the play of the free enterprise system and do not derive
from an umbrella concept of privacy. Medical confidentiality
heads the list. Certainly on the list are confidential communica-
tions with lawyers and confessions to the clergy. The common
law gives us rights of privacy in our homes and while reading
poetry in our gardens. There is no present need to tamper with
these on any wholesale basis.
As to the general compulsion that our income and assets
(including bank accounts) be kept confidential, the author is not
sure what to say. He was well trained by his parents not to dis-
cuss money or sex and continues to abide by the advice. Per-
haps this social norm should be examined. In any case, our
bank records are now protected by a broad variety of state stat-
utes and common law doctrines including the law of quasi-con-
tract 46 (protecting the level of privacy it is generally assumed
that we want). Our current level of bank privacy is believed ac-
ceptable-or else there would have been a revolt or some mas-
sive change of banks before now.47
Our present messy system of free enterprise, whose major
tenet is that problems will work themselves out and should not
be dealt with by legislatures or regulators, should be allowed to
function. It should be supported by the equally unsatisfying sys-
tem of the common law which, more often than not, does not
even attempt to deal with problems as much as with particular
conflicts and leaves the problems to work themselves out to-
morrow. Today's law of privacy is a vast collection of federal
and state constitutions, statutes, regulations, and common law
46. See generally FISCHER, supra note 3.
47. With the free enterprise system in place, dissatisfaction with existing banks
would have caused other, newer, banks to be created with the desired levels of pri-
vacy. That this has not happened is a prime source of belief that the existing system is
acceptable.
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principles that are there for the beleaguered consumer and his
clever lawyer to use as needed. They are probably our best
method for dealing with the difficult issue of privacy.
